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THE NEPAL PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON
HERITAGE FUND:
PANACEA OR PIPEDREAM?
WILLIAM C. LYNCH*
In an article entitled The Nepal Proposalfora Common Heritage Fund,' Professor John L. Logue discusses and urges the adoption of the proposal for a common heritage fund advanced by
Nepal at the Seventh Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).2 Under the Common
Heritage Fund (Nepal) Proposal, each coastal state would contribute a portion of the revenue realized from exploitation of its offshore seabed minerals to an international fund, which would be
3
used to aid developing nations.
Professor Logue believes that adoption of the Nepal Proposal
would serve two purposes: it would break the current deadlock
over the deep seabed mining issue at UNCLOS III, and it would
restore meaning and vitality to the concept that the resources of the
deep seabed are the "common heritage of mankind."'
The Nepal Proposal and Professor Logue's advocacy are appealingly idealistic. In an international community where the disparate possession and consumption of the world's riches
increasingly separates the have and have-not nations, any proposal
* Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; LL.M., 1968, George
Washington University; A.B., 1953, J.D., 1956, Boston College.
The invaluable assistance of Michael Morin in the preparation of this article is
gratefully acknowledged.
1. Logue, The Nepal Proposalfor a Common Heritage Fund, 9 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.
598 (1979).

2. The proposal was introduced at the seventh session of UNCLOS III at Geneva,
Switzerland, on May 19, 1978. UNCLOS III,
a comprehensive international conference, was
authorized by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1970. G.A. Res. 2750C,
25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 26, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). The Conference received a
mandate to conduct a wide-ranging review of the law of the sea, with a view toward a new
treaty or treaties that would modernize and synthesize the international rules governing use
of the oceans. Since its initial meeting in Caracas, Venezuela, in the summer of 1974, the
Conference has continued to meet in Geneva and New York.
3. Memorandum by the Leader of the Delegation of Nepal Relating to the Establishment of a Common Heritage Fund in the Interest of Mankind as a Whole but Particularly in
the Interest of Developing Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/65 (1978).
4. Logue, supra note 1,at 599-600, 606.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1980

1

California Western
International
Law
Journal, Vol. 10,
No.
1 [1980], Art. 3Vol. 10
CALIFORNIA
WESTERN
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
JOURNAL

to ease that inequality must be seriously considered. However, because it overlooks major political and legal developments in the law
of the sea over the last three decades, the Nepal Proposal has merit
only in its idealism. Moreover, Professor Logue's advocacy of the
proposal, like other high-minded but unrealistic ideas, may even
have a negative effect by raising false hopes for what UNCLOS III
may produce.
Three postulates appear to underlie Professor Logue's article.
First, the conferees at UNCLOS III, by means of the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT),5 have created a new regime
of law in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to regulate the extraction of hydrocarbons from the seabed.6 Second, the developed
world, particularly the United States, has either fostered the creation of the EEZ or has failed by inaction to prevent its creation.7
Third, the Nepal Proposal is consistent with the sovereign rights a
coastal state enjoys over its offshore resources.' This article contends that all three postulates are in error, and, that without their
supporting logic, Professor Logue's thesis in favor of the Nepal Proposal fails.
I.

THE FIRST POSTULATE

The ICNT is the current version of the draft law of the sea
treaty articles produced by the conferees at UNCLOS III. Part V,
Articles 55 through 75, of the ICNT provides for exclusive coastal
state control of the resources of the seabed within the EEZ, which
extends 200 miles seaward from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. 9 Professor Logue argues that the ICNT has
awarded the lion's share of total seabed resources to coastal states,
because the seabed area seaward of the EEZ contains virtually no
hydrocarbons - the richest potential source of development capital
for the disadvantaged, poorer nations of the world.' 0 Because the
5. 8

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW

i, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10 (1977).
6. See Logue, supra note I, at 601, 606-07, 612, 614, 619.
7. Id. at 601.
8. Id. at 610.
9. Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/WP. 10/Rev. 1 (1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 686 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as ICNT/Rev. 1]. Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205,
define the baseline of the territorial sea and describe the methods by which the baseline may
be constructed.
10. See Logue, supra note 1, at 606-08.
OF THE SEA
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Nepal Proposal would apply to revenue realized from mineral exploitation within the 200-mile EEZ, where most of the world's offshore hydrocarbon deposits are located, Professor Logue reasons
that adoption of the proposal would very quickly create a large international fund for the developing world.t'
However, this reasoning process contains a flaw - the idea
that the ICNT, by awarding coastal states exclusive control over all
the resources of the EEZ, has created a new regime of law still open
to renegotiation by the conferees at UNCLOS III. Such an idea
ignores a body of state practice concerning offshore claims that has
steadily grown since World War 11.12 In fact, the increase in the
number and extent of these offshore claims was one of the factors
that prompted the convening of UNCLOS III.' 3 Until the post-

World War II period, the law of the sea had been a relatively stable
branch of international law.' 4 With the postwar breakup of the colonial empires and the creation of many new nations, unusual
claims to ocean space began to be heard,' 5 and the law of the sea
became increasingly less stable. The international community attempted to codify and stabilize the law of the sea at UNCLOS I
(1958) and UNCLOS II (1960).1 6 The failure of these two Conferences to draw a definitive limit to the territorial sea and to define
fishery zones provided encouragement to those countries seeking
expansion of coastal state jurisdiction and created an atmosphere
which led, ultimately, to UNCLOS III. 7
It is suggested here that the provisions of the ICNT recogniz11.

Id. at 607-10.
12. See text accompanying notes 20-80 infra.
13. See Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparationsfor the Law of the Sea Conference, 68
AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1974); Friedmann, Selden Redivivus - Towards a Partitionof the Sea,
65 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 758 (1971).

14. See generally Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law ofthe Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1958).

15. Id. at 610; see generally Garcia-Amador, The Latin American Contributionto the
Development of the Law of the Sea, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 33 (1974).
16. After extensive preparatory work by the International Law Commission (ILC), 86
states met in Geneva from February 24 to April 28, 1958, and adopted four treaties on the
law of the sea, which articulated principles of international law governing the territorial sea
and contiguous zone, the high seas, the continental shelf, and fisheries. For an authoritative
report on the 1958 Conference, see Dean, supra note 14. Because the 1958 Conference was
unsuccessful in reaching agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea and on limits to
fishery zones, a second conference met to deal with these two issues from March 17 to April
27, 1960. This Conference similarly failed to reach agreement. The political events that
dominated the second conference are described in Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on
the Law ofthe Sea: The Fightfor Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 751 (1960).
17. Smith & Hodgson, Unilateralism: The Wave ofthe Future?, in LAW OF THE SEA 137
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ing coastal state authority in a 200-mile zone has created nothing
new in principle. The detailed provisions of Part V of the ICNT
reflect the decisions of the conferees at UNCLOS III;18 however,
the principle of coastal state control over resources within a 200mile zone was established in state practice even before the first session of UNCLOS III at Caracas in 1974.19
A.

State Claims

During the period between the end of World War II and the
convening of UNCLOS III, extended coastal state claims to ocean
space generally took two forms - those related to the mineral or
nonliving resources of the continental shelf, and those related to the
living resources of the offshore waters of the coastal state. The prototype seabed claim was the well-known Truman Proclamation of
1945,20 which asserted the United States' exclusive right to explore

and exploit the mineral resources of the continental shelf. Thirteen
years later, these seabed claims received international confirmation
and recognition in the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf.E' As the language of that treaty suggests, seabed claims were
made not in terms of seaward distances, but were based instead
upon water depth or the seaward extension of the continental
shelf.22
The true forerunners of the 200-mile EEZ were the claims to
offshore living resources. Not coincidentally, many of these early
living-resource claims asserted exclusive rights of conservation over
fisheries of the continental shelf, with no seaward mileage limitations. 23 It should be remembered that in the years immediately fol(E. Miles & J. Gamble eds. 1976); G.A. Res. 2750C, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/L.562 (1970); 64
DEP'T STATE BULL. 152-53 (1971).
18. ICNT/Rev. 1, supra note 9.
19. In fact, members of the Sea-Beds Committee (forerunner of UNCLOS) had already
proposed the 200-mile limit. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 21) 72, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/79 (1972); 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 30, U.N. Doc.
9021 (1973).
20. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation), reprintedin 59 Stat. 884 (1945), and 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 485 (1945).
21. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
22. Id. art. 1. The effect of the development of continental shelf law on the Nepal
Proposal and Professor Logue's article is discussed in the text accompanying notes 135-59
infra.
23. Garcia-Amador, supra note 15, at 33-36.
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lowing World War II, a claim to ocean space in excess of twelve
miles from shore was, if not an absurdity, at least an international
curiosity.24 In 1952, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru signed the tripartite
Declaration of Santiago. 25 The Declaration, in terms of international precedent, did for 200-mile zone claims what the Truman
Proclamation had done for the continental shelf claims - it legitimized them. Although individual Latin American nations Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras - had made
200-mile claims prior to 1952,26 the Declaration of Santiago became the paradigm for the conservation and fishery zone claims
that ensued. After 1952, claims in excess of twelve miles, not all of
which extended to 200 miles, owed much of their respectability to
the Declaration of Santiago.
A brief historical review of claims in excess of twelve miles,
with particular emphasis on claims of 200 miles, is revealing. By
1960, the year of UNCLOS II, the original five "200-mile" Latin
28
27
American nations had been joined by Ecuador and Panama.
Ceylon 29 and India3" claimed 100-mile fishery conservation zones.
Vietnam, 3 the Dominican Republic,3 2 Iceland,3 3 and Korea3 4 had
fishing claims ranging from twenty kilometers (about twelve miles)
to a limit that coincided with the outer limit of the continental
shelf. A total of thirteen countries had asserted claims beyond
twelve miles; seven of them had asserted claims to 200 miles.
24. Gutteridge, Beyond the Three Mile Limit.- Recent Developments Affecting the Law of
the Sea, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 195, 198 (1974).
25. Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER. B/6, at 723 (1956).
26. See Declaration on the Maritime Zone, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/10/Rev. 1, at 11-12
(1968), reprinted in I NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 231 (S. Lay, R. Churchill &

M. Nordquist eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as I NEW DIRECTIONS]; see also U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTIONS, PUB. No. 36, at 17, 91, 21, 30, 47
(2d rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as PUB. No. 361.
27. See Decree Law 003 of Feb. 22, 1951, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 28,
reprintedin U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/18, at 15 (1976).
28. See U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/I, at 15-16 (1951).
29. See Proclamation of Governor-General, Dec. 20, 1957, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra
note 26, at 109, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/16, at 318 (1974).
30. See President's Proclamation of Nov. 29, 1956, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26,
at 51, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/16, at 303-04.
31. See Decree of Sept. 22, 1936, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 136.
32. See Law No. 3342 of July 13, 1952, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 27.
33. See Law No. 44 of Apr. 5, 1948, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 49, reprinted
in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/18, at 331 (1976).
34. Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over Adjacent Seas of Jan. 18, 1952, cited
in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 66.
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In 1967, the year of Ambassador Pardo's "common heritage"
speech to the United Nations General Assembly,35 the list of countries with claims of more than twelve miles had grown to sixteen.
Of that number, eight claimed 200-mile zones; Argentina 36 and
Nicaragua 37 had joined the 200-mile group. Ghana 38 and Pakistan39 claimed 100-mile fishery zones; Guinea' ° claimed a 130-mile
territorial sea; and Cameroon 4" claimed an eighteen-mile territorial
sea. Changes in the laws of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
42
and Honduras temporarily removed them from the list.
In 1973, the year before UNCLOS III began, thirty-two countries made claims of greater than twelve miles. 43 Twelve claimed
47
200-mile zones; Brazil,' Sierra Leone, 45 Somalia,' and Uruguay
had joined the 200-mile group. Other newcomers were the
35. U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967); U.N. Doc. A/C.l/p.v. 1515-16 (1967).
36. See Law No. 17.094 of Dec. 29, 1966, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 3,
reprintedin U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/15, at 45 (1970).
37. See Decree No. II of Apr. 5, 1965, Delimiting the National Fishing Zone to 200
Nautical Miles, arts. 1-2, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/15, at 656 (1970).
38. See Article 175, cited in PUB. No. 36, upra note 26, at 40, reprinted in U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER. B/16, at 10 (1974), and 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

34 (1963).
39. See President's Proclamation of Feb. 19, 1966, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26,
at 89, reprintedin U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/18, at 344 (1976). Pakistan claimed 100 miles
from the outer limit of the territorial sea, whereas Ghana claimed 100 miles from the baseline.
40. See Decree No. 224 of June 3, 1964, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 44,
reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/15, at 87 (1970).
41. See Ordinance GP JFT/25, Nov. 13, 1967, citedin PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 14,
reprintedin U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/15, at 51 (1970).
42. Honduras shortened its territorial sea to 12 n.m. (nautical miles) in 1957, HOND.
CONST. art. 5. The Dominican Republic went from a 15 n.m. fishing zone to a 12 n.m.
fishing zone in 1967. While Costa Rica had adhered to the Declaration on the Maritime
Zone of 1952 on October 3, 1955, in 1966 the President declared that this violated the Costa
Rican Constitution. See PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 27, 47.
43. Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Iceland, India, Korea, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Vietnam.
44. See Decree-Law 553 of Apr. 25, 1969, citedin PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 10. See
Decree-Law of March 25, 1970 (revoking Decree-Law No. 553 of Apr. 25, 1969), reprinted in
10 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1224 (1976).

45. See The Interpretation Act of Apr. 19, 1971, citedin PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at
101.
46. See Law No. 37, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 103.
47. See Law No. 13.833 of Dec. 29, 1969, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 132.
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Congo,4 8 Gabon,4 9 Haiti,5 0 Iceland, 5 Madagascar, 52 Mal57 Senegal,5 8
56
dives,53 Mauritania,54 Morocco,5 5 Nigeria, Oman,
and Tanzania. 9 It is worth noting that several of the new claims in
excess of twelve miles involved assertions.of territorial sovereignty
rather than assertions of exclusive conservation zones. What had
begun as an arguable state conservation practice had become, in
part at least, a movement toward appropriation of ocean space
under total coastal state jurisdiction.6"
In addition to individual state claims, two 'significant regions
of the developing world - Latin America and Africa - issued declarations regarding the EEZ in the years immediately preceding the
convening of UNCLOS III at Caracas in 1974. Nine Latin American nations issued the Montevideo Declaration on May 8, 1970.61
This Declaration provided in pertinent part:
Recognizing ...

that any norms governing the limits of national

sovereignty and jurisdiction over the sea, its soil and subsoil, and
the conditions for the exploitation of their resources, must take
account ofthe geographical realities of the coastal States and the
48. See PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 20.
49. See Decree of July 21, 1972, citedin PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 37, reprintedin
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/16, at 10 (1974).
50. See Decree of Apr. 6, 1972, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 46.
51. See Resolution of Feb. 17, 1972, citedin PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 49, reprinted
in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/18, at 331 (1976).
52. See Ordinance No. 73-060 of Sept. 28, 1973, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at
71, reprintedin U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/18, at 27 (1976).
53. See Act No. 52/70 of Dec. 30, 1970, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 73,
reprintedin U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/18, at 28 (1976).
54. See Law of July 31, 1972, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 75, reprinted in
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/16, at 17 (1974).
55. See Dahir of March 9, 1973, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 79, reprintedin
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/18, at 29 (1976).
56. See Decree No. 38 of Aug. 26, 1971, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 85,
reprintedin U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/16, at 20 (1974).
57. See Decree of July 17, 1972, citedin PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 88.
58. See Law No. 20 of Apr. 10, 1972, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 100.
59. See Proclamation of Aug. 24, 1973, cited in PUB. No. 36, supra note 26, at 113,
reprintedin U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/18, at 31 (1976).
60. Franck, El Baradei, & Aron, The New Poor. Land Locked, ShelfLocked and Other
GeographicallyDisadvantagedStates, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 33 (1974). In the introduction of their article, the authors suggest a strong parallel between the claims to ocean space
by coastal states at the commencement of UNCLOS III and the "era of Land colonization
between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the nineteenth century land rush in the
American West." Id.
61. Montevideo Declaration on Law of the Sea, May 8, 1970, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/34
(1970), reprintedin 9 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1081 (1970), and I NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note
26, at 106.
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special needs and economic and social responsibilities of developing States,
Considering: . . .
That,. . . the signatory States have, by reason of conditions

peculiar to them, extended their sovereignty or exclusive rights
of jurisdiction over the maritime area adjacent to their coasts, its
soil and its subsoil to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baseline of the territorial sea, ...
Declare the following to be Basic Principles of the law of the
sea:
2. The right to establish the limits of their maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction in accordance with the geographical and
geological characteristics and with the factors governing the
existence of marine resources and the need for their rational utilization ....

62

The Montevideo Declaration was reinforced by a similar declaration at Lima from fourteen Latin American nations on August 8,
1970.63

From June 5 to June 9, 1972, the Specialized Conference of
Caribbean Countries Concerning Problems of the Sea, met at Santo
Domingo.' 4 Once again they affirmed the right of coastal states to
nonliving resources of the
assert jurisdiction over both living and
65
sea and seabed seaward to 200 miles.
Representatives of seventeen African nations met at Yaounde,
Cameroon, in June 1972, in a regional seminar on law of the sea.66
They recommended adoption of a series of principles which, inter
alia, approved the establishment of an economic zone beyond the
limit of the territorial sea and the right of each coastal state to determine the seaward limits of such a zone.6 7

In May 1973, before the beginning of UNCLOS III at Caracas,
the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity
62.

Reprintedin 9 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1081, n.50 (1970), and I NEW DIRECTIONS, supra

note 26, at 235-36.
63. Declaration of the Latin American States on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/AC.
138/28 (1970), reprintedin 10 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 107 (1971).

64. Declaration of Santo Domingo, June 7, 1972, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 70,
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/80 (1972), reprintedin II INT'L LEGAL MATS. 892 (1972).

65. Id.
66. Yaounde Conclusions of the Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea, June 20-30,
1972, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 74, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/79 (1972), reprintedin 12
INT'L LEGAL MATS. 210 (1973).

67. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss1/3

8

Lynch: The Nepal ProposalTHE
for aNEPAL
Common
Heritage Fund: Panacea or Pipedre
PROPOSAL

issued a series of declarations on the law of the sea.6 8 Among these
declarations was the explicit recognition of "the right of each
coastal State to establish an exclusive economic zone beyond their
territorial seas whose limits shall not exceed 200 nautical miles,
measured from the baseline establishing their territorial seas
[Sic]."

69

Thus, before UNCLOS III began, not only did twelve nations
claim 200-mile zones but thirty-two nations claimed zones of more
than twelve miles, and Latin America and Africa strongly supported the principle of coastal state exclusive control over all resources, living and nonliving, within a 200-mile zone. A total of
fifty-nine countries supported the Latin American and Yaounde
declarations.7 ° Although only twelve of those countries had actually made 200-mile claims, the support of the principle of coastal
state control over 200 miles of ocean by all fifty-nine countries
demonstrates that the idea was not that of an unrepresentative minority.
In 1976, the number of claims greater than twelve miles had
increased to sixty, 7 ' and of that number, thirty-one countries
claimed 200-mile zones.7 2 Significantly, this was the first year in
which developed countries had joined the 200-mile group. Among
68. Organization of African Unity, Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa Declaration of
Issues of the Law of the Sea, May 24, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/89 (1973), reprintedin 12
INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1200 (1973).
69. 12 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1204 (1973).
70. The following are countries supporting the Declaration of Montevideo: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay.
The countries supporting the Santo Domingo Declaration were: Colombia, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Venezuela.
The countries supporting the Organization of African Unity Declaration were: Algeria,
Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt,
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, and Zambia. See generally, Montevideo Declaration on
Law of the Sea, supra note 61.
71. See PuB. No. 36, supra note 26, and CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NATIONAL
BASIC INTELLIGENCE FACT BOOK 3-4 (1979).
72. Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Comoro Islands, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, West Germany, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, and the United
States. Id.
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these developed countries were Canada,7 3 the United States, 74 the
7
77
76
United Kingdom, 75 France, the Soviet Union, and Norway.
By January 1, 1979, sixty-three countries had claimed 200-mile
zones, 79 and eighteen others claimed zones ranging from fifteen to
150 miles.8 0
The statistics reviewed above clearly demonstrate that there
has been a steady and irreversible trend over the past nineteen
years toward widespread acceptance of a 200-mile zone. This process was well under way and had begun to accelerate even before
the UNCLOS III meeting in Caracas. When Professor Logue describes the nations of the world as retreating from the principle of
the common heritage at Caracas, he is, therefore, misleading. In
fact, the conferees were not retreating from the principle. It had
been abandoned before UNCLOS III began. Those countries
which adopted the 200-mile zone after the convening of UNCLOS
III were merely conforming their national law to what had become
an established international pattern.

II.

THE SECOND POSTULATE

Professor Logue contends that the United States and the Soviet
Union, if not the leaders in the retreat from the common heritage
principle, were at least the creators of a "band-wagon" effect
through their desertion of the principle at Caracas. 8 ' He implies
that the developed countries, and particularly the United States,
could have forestalled the incorporation of the 200-mile EEZ in the
ICNT by standing fast at Caracas. 2 The evidence to the contrary
is overwhelming.
Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 & 5) Order, S.O.R./77-62, reprintedin V NEW
(S. Lay, R. Churchill, & M. Nordquist eds. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as V NEW DIRECTIONS].
74. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1976),
reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 635 (1976).
75. Fishery Limits Act, 1976, c.16, art. 1.
76. Law No. 76-655 of July 16, 1976, reprintedin V NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 73, at
301.
77. Union of Soviet Socialists Republic: Edict on Provisional Measures for the Preservation of Living Resources and the Regulation of Fishing in Marine Areas, Edict of the
Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, December 10, 1976, reprintedin 15 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 1381 (1976).
78. Law No. 91 of Dec. 17, 1976, reprintedin V NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 73, at 337.
79. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 71, at 1-4.
80. See id. at 5.
81. Logue, supra note 1, at 606.
82. Id. at 601, 606.
73.
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At Caracas, UNCLOS III conducted its business in three
Committees (I, II, and III)." 3 Committee II was charged with responsibility for the discussion and preparation of draft articles on
coastal zones, including the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and
of labels ranging
the EEZ, 4 which was then known under a variety
85 to patrimonial sea. 86
zones
from conservation
During July and August 1974 at Caracas, Committee II held
meetings at which the representatives of the attending countries expressed the views of their governments on the 200-mile zone. 87 The
records of those meetings disclose that the overwhelming majority
opposed it, while
spoke in favor of the 200-mile zone. A few nations
88
a few others were essentially noncommittal.
To state that the 200-mile zone was supported by an overwhelming majority does not adequately characterize the depth of
that support, even at that early stage of UNCLOS III. The fervor
and solidarity of the EEZ support can better be ascertained from
excerpts of the delegates' speeches on the subject.
A.

Statements by the Developing Countries' Representatives

As summarized in the Summary Record,
[The representative of Honduras] said that his country claimed
inherent rights over the resources in its adjacent zones and had
established control over hunting, fishing and other exploitation
in those waters. Foreign States had no competence in those
zones except on the basis of agreement with the coastal State.
His country maintained the principle that the outer limit of the
territorial sea had never constituted a limit on the inherent right
of States over their resources. Free and unimpeded activities in
83. The organization of UNCLOS III is patterned closely after the United Nations SeaBeds Committee, which was both the forerunner of and preparatory conference for
UNCLOS III. Committee I dealt with the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
Committee 11 dealt with coastal state jurisdiction over the coastal areas of the ocean, the
continental shelf, fisheries, and high seas; Committee III dealt with pollution and scientific
research. These organizational arrangements are discussed in Stevenson & Oxman, spra
note 13, at 4, 8, 23, and in Stevenson & Oxman, The Third UnitedNations Conference on the
Law ofthe Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1975).
84. Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 83, at 3; U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62 (1975).
85. See note 39 supra.
86. See the draft articles submitted by Haiti and Jamaica to Committee II at Caracas,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/L.35 (1974).
87. See text accompanying notes 89-117 infra.
88. Owing to the nature of some of the speeches and the complex geopolitical, economic, and social issues involved, it is not possible to list the exact positions of each country.
However, a sound estimate of 73% in favor of the 200-mile zone can be found in Alexander
& Hodgson, The Impact ofthe 200-Mile Economic Zone on the Law ofthe Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 569, 570 (1975).
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the adjacent zones were a conventional rather than a customary
only on States parties to a treaty
freedom, which was binding
89
relating to those zones.
Nigeria maintained "that . . . the 200-nautical-mile limit to

the exclusive economic zone stipulated in article 1, paragraph 1, [of
the draft treaty articles] reflected the consensusformula on that issue."

90

Mexico, a sponsor of the draft articles which proposed a 200mile zone, maintained that the twelve-mile territorial sea limit
"presupposed acceptance of an economic zone of 200 miles," and
that the various elements in the arrangements of ocean zones were
"indissolubly interrelated."'
The German Democratic Republic, which, because of geographical constraints, could not hope to benefit from a 200-mile
zone, supported the concept because of its sympathy for "the proposals of the developing countries favouring the establishment of an
economic zone. "192

Upper Volta, a landlocked developing country with no apparent benefit to be derived from a zone that would simply remove it
200 miles farther from ocean resources, nevertheless supported the
zone, calling it an "economic necessity" and asserting that the govunderstood the motives of those
ernment of Upper Volta "fully
93
who support the concept."
Paraguay, apparently concerned lest developing country brethren misconstrue its prior opposition toward the 200-mile zone at the
1970 Lima meeting on the law of the sea, spoke in favor of the 200mile zone.9 4 Paraguay, a landlocked country, perceived its interests
as being promoted by maximization of the international areas of
the oceans, and threatened by vastly increased coastal state jurisdiction. To the outside observer, therefore, Paraguay might have
appeared to have been aligned with the developed countries which,
before UNCLOS III and at its initial stages, were attempting to
89. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR. 22, at 171 (1974). The inference here is that even
the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight are not free from coastal state control.
90. Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 173.
92. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 174.
94. As to the limit and the regime to be applied in the economic zone, his delegation maintained its position that the zone should not extend beyond 200 miles - a
distance that should be coextensive with the continental shelf, namely, the sea-bed
and the subsoil, together with the water column and the surface of the sea. Such
uniformity would offer decisive practical and legal advantages.
1d. at 175.
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stem the flood of 200-mile claims,95 or at least restrict their impact.
Evidently concerned over this alignment, the representative of
Paraguay expressly "rejected any allegations of collusion with the
highly developed countries: the fact that their position was in certain cases similar to those of his own country was a mere coincidence."9 6
Congo, in a ringing declaration of support for the 200-mile
zone, characterized the zone as a significant tool in the developing
country's efforts to make its way in the modem world: "The developing coastal State should have permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in particular, living and non-living marine
resources. No State should be subjected to economic, political or
the full and free exercise of its inalienable
other pressure to prevent
97
sovereignty.
of
right
Tanzania addressed the very aspect of the 200-mile zone that
has troubled Professor Logue and the adherents of the Nepal Proposal - the exclusion of hydrocarbon resources, which otherwise
would be shared by the developing nations under the concept of the
common heritage of mankind. As summarized in the Summary
Record,
[I]t had been argued that the exclusive economic zone would
drain the resources that comprised the common heritage. But
the 200 miles of economic zone was intended to replace the legal
continental shelf and the concept of fishery zones. No opponents
of the concept could honestly accuse its proponents of draining
the common heritage with regard to living resources, for they
themselves had refused to include them in that heritage. Scientists had said that the best and most extensive mineral resources
lay far from the coasts and, with regard to oil and gas, the ecoat least some of the continental shelf in
nomic zone would leave
98
the international area.
Although the scientific assurances that the Tanzanian government
offered appear to be less than clear, the desire of Tanzania to secure
for itself alone the mineral resources of the zone suffers from no
such lack of clarity. Later, the Tanzanian representative described
the EEZ as "particularly important to developing countries, especially in Africa, and that the EEZ would be a key point in determining his delegation's judgment on the outcome of the
95.
96.
97.
98.

See text accompanying notes 108-18 infra.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR. 22, at 175 (1974).
Id.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR. 23, at 182 (1974).
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negotiations in progress." 99 Evidently he was prepared to overlook
the disadvantages of the 200-mile zone to the landlocked and other
geographically disadvantaged developing states.
The Kenyan representatives, apprehensive that the 200-mile
EEZ might be "unduly diluted"' ° by its opponents, stated that if
the zone were not adopted they would "have to resort to claiming a
broad territorialsea limit of 200 nautical miles in order to assert
their justified concern over their resources."'' °
India and Chile summed up what at that point in the discussions had become obvious. The EEZ was a fact of international
life; it could not be talked or negotiated away. India's representative stated that "[tihe concept of an exclusive economic zone had
received 02
more support than any other issue or item before the Conference.
According to the Summary Record,
[Chili's representative] said that the economic zone could be defined legally as a jurisdictional zone over which the coastal State
exercised sovereign rights of a primarily economic nature, without prejudice to the freedoms of navigation and overflight, up to
a distance of 200 miles. That definition was no longer an abstract
been supportedin the generaldebate by more than
concept; it had
10 3
100 States.

B.

Statements by Developed Countries' Representatives

At several points in his article, Professor Logue suggests that
the developing countries were slow to realize the implications of
granting coastal state exclusive jurisdiction over resources within
the zone, 'O and that the zone was "shrewdly packaged,"' 1 5 although by whom he does not indicate. As a result, he concludes
that support for the concept is not deeply based."0 The sometimes
strident rhetoric of the developing countries in support of the zone,
quoted above, points to a contrary conclusion. Moreover, warnings
from Poland and Byelorussia and the ambivalent positions of the
developed countries underscore this contrary conclusion.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 210-11 (emphasis added).
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR. 24, at 191 (1974).
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR. 25, at 203 (1974) (emphasis added).
Logue, supra note 1, at 601, 607, 621.
Id. at 618-19.
Id.at 601, 615.
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During these 1974 summer meetings, as delegation after delegation from developing countries made speeches in favor of the
200-mile zone, Poland warned the developing countries that the
recognition of the zone in international law would not benefit the
many, but the few.' 7 Although Poland was discussing the question
of fisheries in the zone, its observations applied with equal force to
seabed resources, because the demands of the developing world
were for inclusion of all resources within the jurisdiction of the
coastal state.
Although it had been argued that the unilateral appropriation of
fish resources in a wide coastal zone would serve the interests of
all developing States, [the Polish representative] pointed out that
more than 50 developing coastal States could be regarded as geographically disadvantaged, while 19 developing States were landlocked Granting unconditional rights in major fishing grounds to
coastal States would mean giving geographically
privileged States
08
additional privileges under international law. 1
The Summary Record reports Byelorussia's position, which
constituted an even more pointed and dramatic warning:
Extending the rights of coastal States beyond the territorial sea
would seriously interfere with the interests of geographically disadvantaged States. Some representatives of land-locked countries had already said that the concept of an exclusive economic
zone was similar to the concept of the annexation or nationalization of the seas. [The Byelorussian representative] agreed with
those who had claimed that developing coastal States which had
unilateraly extended their national jurisdiction to wide zones had
themselves undermined the principle of the common heritage of
mankind adopted in General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV), as
their action reduced the size of the international area.'

°9

France's representative, by contrast, outlined several of the difficulties inherent in the concept of the 200-mile zone." 0 Recognizing power in the coastal state over the resources in a 200-mile zone
would pose a threat to freedom of navigation, freedom of communication, and freedom of scientific research.I" While France's
views were not directly opposed to the 200-mile concept, they reflected France's "desire to prevent vast areas of the oceans from
being made subject to the sovereignty of coastal States because...
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR. 26, at 202 (1974).
Id.(emphasis added).
Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR. 23, at 184-86 (1974).
Id.at 185.
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such an extension of sovereignty would run counter to history and,
already exermoreover, would benefit primarily those States' which
12
cised sovereignty over the largest land areas." "
The United Kingdom found the 200-mile concept "not attractive," " 3 because it would "markedly affect existing and established
rights in international law.""' 4 Although the concept covered only
the resources of the seabed and the water column, the United Kingdom representative noted "a growing tendency to take for granted
those rights to the resources, and to make demands for further competences, not directly related to resources, within the zone."' 15 Accordingly, the United Kingdom viewed the concept coolly and with
a clear eye toward the dangers it presented to internationalism in
the oceans.
Similarly, the United States spoke cautiously about the 200mile zone, supporting it only "as part of an overall acceptable convention" and asserting that such a convention would have "to reconcile the primary interests of the coastal State in resources with
the primary interests of all States in navigation and other uses."" 6
The United States representative stated that "[aichieving a balance
of that kind was a delicate task that could be accomplished only by
a series of carefully drafted articles."" 7 These are hardly the comments of a country whose strategy was to seize ocean resources at
the expense of the common heritage of mankind principle and, ultimately, of the developing world. Indeed, had the United States
simply voted for its own economic interests as the nation with the
largest potential EEZ,"18 a position such as that quoted above
would have been nonsensical.
A fair interpretation of the positions taken at Caracas strongly
suggests that the 200-mile zone is a creation of the developing
world. The concept has been consistently and assiduously cultivated and promoted by developing nations. Even developing nations that would be directly and palpably disadvantaged by
adoption of the 200-mile zone felt compelled to speak in favor of it
for fear of incurring the disapproval of their developing world
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 186.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR. 25, at 200 (1974).
Id.
Id.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR. 24, at 190 (1974).
Id.
See OFF. OF THE GEOGRAPHER, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEA No. 46, THEORETICAL

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss1/3

(Series A 1972).

16

NEPAL PROPOSAL
THE
Lynch: The Nepal Proposal for
a Common
Heritage Fund: Panacea or Pipedre

brethren. Developed countries' positions at Caracas, on the other
hand, were less than enthusiastic. They perceived dangers to
deeply cherished high seas freedoms if the zone were adopted.
Their support was conditioned upon agreement to an acceptable
solution to all law of the sea issues.
The above conclusion is shared by other writers. Elizabeth
Mann Borghese, recognized as an ardent advocate for the developing world in law of the sea and economic issues, noted that the
rapid acceptance of the 200-mile zone would benefit principally the
developed world, and that developing nations had embraced a concept that was not in their best interests." 9
It may be politic to conclude that the developing world was
misled or uninformed, but a simpler, though less edifying, conclusion suggest itself. The developing coastal states, inspired by the
success of the Latin Americans in defying the developed countries
(particularly the United States) with the 200-mile zone, and mindful of the direct and exclusive benefits to be derived by each of
them in a 200-mile zone, found it easy to overlook both the imperatives of the common heritage of mankind and the claims of their
landlocked and shelf-locked developing brethren. In short, self-interest prevailed over the interests of the international community -a community comprised largely of other nations whose economic,
social, and political problems paralleled their own. This conclusion
is not meant to be an indictment of the developing coastal states. It
is offered solely to refute Professor Logue's implications of uninformed choice by, or manipulation of, the developing countries. In
choosing what they perceived to be their own interests, the developing nations were perhaps merely repeating the attitudes and
decisions of most nations during the development of modern international law.
III.
A.

THE THIRD POSTULATE

PoliticalConstraints.- The New International
Economic Order

Anticipating the argument that the 200-mile zone is afait accompli, Professor Logue asserts that the Nepal Proposal is not inconsistent with the EEZ concept and the exclusive resource rights
119. Borghese, Boom, Doom and Gloom over the Ocean: The Economic Zone, the Developing Nations, andthe Conference on the Law of the Sea, I I SAN DIEGO L. REV. 541, 547-48
(1974).
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enjoyed by the coastal state within the zone. 120 Rather, by making
an analogy to the homeowner and property taxes, he claims that the
proposal would respect the sovereignty of the coastal state: "In the
same way that a homeowner is required to pay a tax on his exclusively owned property, the coastal state would be taxed on the revenues from mineral exploitation in its exclusively owned EEZ."''
As beguiling and attractive as the homeowner analogy may be,
it fails to take into account the highly significant legal and political
differences between the status of the domestic homeowner and that
of the sovereign nation. A sovereign nation cannot, without its consent, be compelled to pay a "tax" to anyone, no matter how laudable the goal or deserving the recipients. The homeowner pays a tax
as part of a complicated socioeconomic and political structure. As
a subordinate unit in society, the homeowner pays his tax, among
other things, in return for the services and protection that society
provides him. In international society, there is no supranational
legislative or executive body to enact tax laws and enforce them,
nor are there equivalent services or protection to be obtained from
supranational organizations. The United Nations, despite its many
considerable achievements, cannot be regarded, even by its most
passionate adherents, as a world government.
It appears to this writer that the "common heritage tax" on the
mineral resources of the EEZ is a sophistical attempt to reconcile
two irreconcilable concepts: the exclusive sovereign right of coastal
states over mineral rights within the EEZ and the right of the developing world to a share in those resources. Such a sophism ignores
the clear expression of the will of the nations gathered at UNCLOS
111.122

There is, however, a stronger argument against the validity or
feasibility of such a tax - the adverse sentiments of the developing
world with regard to control over national resources. Professor
Logue is correct in his analysis of the deep seabed mining impasse. 12 3 It represents the crystallization of the conflict between the
developing nations, who desire a New International Economic Order (NIEO), 24 and the developed nations, who may acknowledge
the morality of the developing world's claims but resist satisfaction
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Logue, supra note i, at 610.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 89-103 supra.
Logue, supra note 1,at 621-23.
See note 129 infra, and accompanying text.
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of those claims.1

Nowhere have the claims for a NIEO been pressed more strenuously than at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).' 2 6 UNCTAD has generally been regarded as
a forum for developing world views on redistribution of the world's
wealth, 1 27 and its resolutions are regarded with considerable caution by the developed world. 12 The UNCTAD resolution most
pertinent to the conflict between the "common heritage" principle
and the EEZ is the Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order:
4. The new international economic order should be
founded on full respect for the following principles:
(a) Sovereign equality of States, self-determination of
all peoples, inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by
force, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states;
(e) Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its
natural resources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise effective
control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to
its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of
the full permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be
subjected to economic or any other type of coercion to prevent
the free and full exercise of this inalienable right .... 129
The position of the developing nations with respect to the EEZ
combines with the nationalistic principles of the NIEO to present
bedrock opposition to the notion of a tax on national resources. At
UNCLOS III, the developing nations unanimously agreed that the
hydrocarbons within the EEZ fall under the sovereignty of the
coastal state.' 3 1 Similarly, there was unanimity among the developing nations at UNCTAD that no nation can be required to submit
125. For an excellent essay on the confrontational nature of the issues involving the
NIEO, see Ferguson, The Politicsofthe New InternationalEconomic Order, in THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS 142-58 (D. Kay ed. 1977).

126. G.A. Res. 2085, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 25 (1965).
Gregg, The Apportioning of PoliticalPower, in THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS
69, 72-73 (D. Kay ed. 1977).
128. Id.
129. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A.
Res. 3201, S-VI U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
130. See text accompanying notes 152-55 infra.
127.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1980

19

California Western
International Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1980], Art. 3Vol.
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

10

to external interference with national resources.' 3 1 It is therefore
clear that the developing coastal states consider their offshore resources to be national wealth, not to be interfered with. Thus, if it
were suggested that the developing coastal states submit to a tax on
what they consider to be their own resources - even a tax for the
benefit of developing countries - it seems certain the tax would be
rejected.
If by some means, the developing coastal states were persuaded to accept a nominal tax on offshore resources with the expectation that the developed countries would provide the bulk of
the tax revenues, their acceptance of the tax would not compel acceptance by the developed countries.132 The same principles of national sovereignty that would enable the developing coastal states
to refuse to submit to a tax would authorize a similar refusal by the
developed coastal states. Principles of national sovereignty and
freedom from external taxation are enjoyed by all nations of the
world, not merely the less fortunate.
To place the Nepal-proposed tax in a better perspective, consider a more graphic proposal. If, in the interest of creating an
international development fund, the United Nations General Assembly proposed that each nation pay an international tax on its
livestock or cereal grains, such a proposal would undoubtedly be
rejected with indignant outcries of "interventionism" and "violation of national sovereignty," and quite properly so. In the present
state of international affairs, no structure or mechanism exists
whereby the individual wealth of one country can be either taxed or
transferred against its will. To say that the Nepal Proposal would
effect such a transfer amicably, in the context of UNCLOS III, begs
the question. Indeed, the UNCLOS III conferees have shown little
interest in the proposal,' 3 3 chiefly because the proposal in effect violates the deeply held convictions of all nations of the world with
regard to their natural resources. 1 34 Characterization of the Nepal
131. See note 28 supra.
132. It is of course a basic postulate of international law that a sovereign state can be
required to submit to the imposition of other states' will only where it has agreed to do so or
where the will of other states represents the force of international law. I L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-23 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). A decision of the developing
nations, even if they represent a majority of the nations of the world, cannot purport to bind
the developed world in the absence of the widespread consensus and recognition required for
customary international law.
133. Logue, supra note 1, at 613-14 n.135. In fact, as of the April 1979 meetings of UNCLOS III, the Common Heritage Fund Proposal had not been officially discussed.
134. See text accompanying notes 123-31 supra.
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Proposal as a mere "tax" on the resources of the EEZ should thus
be seen for what it is - a sincere but ineffective attempt to persuade the nations of the world to undo what they have already
done.
As Professor Logue noted in his article, the United States, in a
farsighted and altruistic effort to accomplish what the Nepal Proposal is attempting today, suggested, in 1970, the yielding of sovereign
rights over the seabed seaward of the 200-meter depth curve and
the establishment of an international regime.135 Although this proposal was made well before the convening of UNCLOS III and the
drafting of the ICNT, it received no significant support in the international community. Although other factors may have been involved, the primary reason for lack of support was that the
proposal derogated from the existing sovereign rights of coastal
states. Nationalistic feeling is perhaps the preeminent standard in
international relations today. Such feeling cannot tolerate either a
"tax" or the imposition of any kind of international regime on natural resources. To argue otherwise is to ignore political reality.
B.

Legal Constraints.- ContinentalShelf Law

In focusing on UNCLOS III, the ICNT, and the EEZ, Professor Logue has ignored what is probably the most formidable obstacle to the Nepal Proposal, the constraints of continental shelf law.
Quite apart from the political events which preceded UNCLOS III
and which have dominated its proceedings, there is a body of international law governing the extraction of mineral resources from the
continental shelf.'36 If this law regulates the entire area of the seabed from the outer limit of the territorial sea to the abyssdl ocean
depths, then the Nepal Proposal would purport to tax resources
which are already subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the coastal
state, and could not, by hypothesis, be considered to be the common heritage of mankind.
It may well be that, irrespective of UNCLOS III and the
ICNT, continental shelf law will dictate whether the developing na135. Logue, supra note 1, at 603.
136. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312 [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention]. While the
Convention sets forth the basic concepts of continental shelf law, the International Court of
Justice has interpreted it, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany
v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. 3, and virtually all
coastal states have taken positions regarding the meaning of the Convention. Each of these
sources is discussed below.
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tions have a right to share in the mineral resources of the coastal
state's continental shelf. A brief review of the history of continental
shelf law and an analysis of its current status suggest that coastal
states have a legal right to refuse to share continental shelf resources as contemplated by the Nepal Proposal.
Following its origin in the Truman Proclamation in 1945, continental shelf law made rapid progress. The international community, at the first UNCLOS at Geneva in 1958, produced a legal
definition of the continental shelf and defined the rights enjoyed by
the coastal state therein:
Article 1
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental
shelf" is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed
and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of
islands.
Article 2
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are
exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore
the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may
undertake these activities, or make a claim to the continental
shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State.
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf
do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any
express proclamation. 13
Unfortunately this definition has probably raised more questions than it has answered. A consensus agrees that the coastal state
exercises sovereign rights over seabed resources out to a line drawn
at the 200-meter depth curve. Where the line should be drawn beyond 200 meters has, since the Geneva Convention was adopted,
been sharply contested. 138 Because the outer limit of coastal state
137. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 136.
138. See B. OXMAN, THE PREPARATION OF ARTICLE I OF THE CONVENTION ON THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF 5-7, 150-60 (Clearing House for Federal Scientific and Technical In-

formation, Monograph No. PB-182-100, 1969); Goldie, A Lexicographical Controversy - the
Word "'Adjacent"in Article I of the Continental Shelf Convention, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 829
(1972) [hereinafter cited as A LexicographicalControversy]; Friedmann, The North Sea Con-
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sovereignty marks the dividing line between the resources available
to the "common heritage of mankind" and those reserved to the
coastal state, its location is critical to the prospects of success for the
Nepal Proposal.
The language of the Convention appears to provide a dual test
for the drawing of the line - exploitability and adjacency.' 39 Be-

cause today's technology acknowledges no apparent engineering
limitations (although economic considerations may exercise restraint)," the open-ended exploitability test provides no limit.
From the language of the Convention, the two concepts that therefore serve to define the outer limit of national jurisdiction are "adjacent" and "continental shelf."
As mentioned previously, there is no single, fixed meaning to
"continental shelf." Geologically, the continental shelf has been
described to mean that portion of the seabed extending seaward
from the coast to about the 200-meter depth curve.'l 4 Because the
exploitability language of the Convention extends coastal states'
rights beyond 200 meters, the continental shelf must encompass
more seabed area legally than it does geologically. Because the exploitability test provides no seaward limit to coastal state jurisdictinentalShef Cases- a Critique, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 229 (1970); Goldie, Delimiting Continental Shef Boundaries and Finlay, Realism v. Idealism as the Key to the Determination of the

Limits of National Jurisdiction oi'er the Continental Shelf, in LIMITS
TION OVER THE SEA 3 (G. Yates & J. Young eds. 1974).

TO NATIONAL JURISDIC-

139. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 136.
140. J. MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA 2, 280 (1965); Burke, Law and the
New Technologies, in LAW OF THE SEA 205 (1967).
141. Perhaps the chief source of the confusion and acrimony, that characterizes the debate concerning the seaward extent of coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf, is
the blending of two separate disciplines, law and geology, in the same definition. Geologically, the seabed area that extends the landmass has three parts: the continental shelf, the
relatively level or gently sloping area immediately contiguous to the coast; the continental
slope, the more steeply declining area seaward of the shelf; and the continental rise, the
declining area between the slope and the deep seabed or abyssal plain. All three areas are
often referred to as the continental margin. The latter phrase is used to denote the three
areas in this article. Although the depth of the superjacent water where the shelf becomes
the slope varies in different parts of the ocean, in general the 200-meter depth curve has been
used to describe the point where the shelf becomes slope. Therefore, the dispute occasioned
by the Continental Shelf Convention definition in reality is concerned, not with the seaward
extent of coastal state jurisdiction over the geological shelf, but with the remainder of the
continental margin - the slope and the rise. By describing the area seaward of the 200meter depth curve as continental shelf, the Convention inevitably confuses physical-geological concepts with legal-political ones. For an excellent geological analysis of the continental
margin, see Hedberg, Relation of Political Boundaries on the Ocean Floor to the Continental
Margin, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 57 (1976-1977). The Appendix to that article lists a variety of
continental margin definitions from scientific rather than legal literature. Id. at 73.
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tion, one must turn to an analysis of the meaning of the word
"adjacent" to ascertain whether it implies a limitation.
Without attempting to summarize the varying points of view
on the meaning of this word, it is probably safe to say that those
who favor a relatively narrow area of coastal state jurisdiction over
the continental shelf argue that "adjacent" has the general meaning
of "near" or "close." In their view, attempts to stretch the meaning
to encompass distances of 100 or 200 miles from shore destroy the
meaning of the word. The opposing view is that adjacent connotes
''appurtenant to" or "an extension of" the land mass of the coastal
state. These two points of view are well exemplified in the exchange between Professor Louis Henkin and Mr. Luke Finlay in
the American Journalof InternationalLaw. 4 2 Professor Henkin argues that if "adjacent" is to have any meaning at all, that meaning
must restrict coastal state jurisdiction to an area less than the entire
continental margin. 4 3 Mr. Finlay contends that the phrase restricts
coastal state jurisdiction over seabed resources merely to the continental margin, which ends at the abyssal ocean depths.'"
Both schools of thought found some comfort in the 1969 International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision on the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. 4' 5 Unhappily for the resolution of the dispute, the
cases before the ICJ did not require a decision regarding the seaward extent of coastal state sovereign rights. The court's description of the shelf as the "natural prolongation of [the coastal state's]
land territory into and under the sea,"' 4 6 however, tends to provide
support to the school of thought that emphasizes the geological aspects of an extended continental shelf definition, at the expense of
those who emphasize the narrowing effect of adjacency.
On the other hand, the ICJ's comment that "by no stretch of
imagination can a point on the continental shelf situated say a hundred miles, or even much less, from a given coast, be regarded as
'adjacent' to it" 4 7 encouraged those who argue for the limiting notion in the word adjacent. Neither of these comments of the ICJ is
142. Henkin, InternationalLaw and "the Interests" The Law of the Seabed, 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 504 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Law ofthe Seabed]; Finlay, The Outer Limits of the
ContinentalShelf, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (1970); Henkin, A Reply to Mr. Finlay, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 62 (1970).
143. Law of the Seabed, supra note 142, at 507-08.
144. Finlay, supra note 142, at 52-57.
145. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 11969] I.C.J. 3.
146. Id. at 22.
147. Id. at 31.
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of definitive assistance, however, because the court was using adjacency as it related to the problem of delimitation of the continental
shelf between neighboring states, and not as it related to the seaward extension of coastal state sovereign rights.' 48 Indeed, since
the entire seabed area of the North Sea was conceded to be continental shelf, the limiting effect of adjacency, if any, could not have
been discussed. The participants in this definitional dispute have
repeatedly appealed to the work of the drafters of the 1958 Convention - the International Law Commission. Here again, both
points of view appear to find support in the work and the deliberations of the Commission, 149 with inconclusive results.
It would appear that, as a matter of semantics, legal theory,
and geology, the issue of where to draw the line has not been definitively settled. At the same time, it seems clear that there is no state
practice supporting the view that the line of national jurisdiction
should be drawn landward of the edge of the continental margin.
On the contrary, most continental shelf claims, excluding shelflocked or other geographically disadvantaged coastal states, appear
to rely on the open-ended exploitability criterion.'5 0
Probably the best evidence of state practice regarding the continental shelf can be found in the expression of national views on
this topic at UNCLOS III. From July 26 to July 31, 1974, at Caracas, Committee II debated the subject of the continental shelf at
5
five meetings where representatives of fifty-five nations spoke.' '
148. A Lexicographical Controversy, supra note 138, at 831-33.
149. One of the subsidiary disputes within the major controversy has been the extent of
the influence of the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources: The Continental Shelf and Marine Waters on the deliberations and formulation of
the International Law Commission (ILC). The Inter-American Conference met in Cuidad
Trujillo in March 1976 and adopted a position favoring coastal state jurisdiction over the
shelf and slope. Mr. Finlay and the proponents of the broad coastal state jurisdiction maintain that the action at Cuidad Trujillo so influenced the ILC that the language chosen by the
ILC to present to the conferees at the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention reflects this broadened area of jurisdiction. See Finlay, supra note 142, at 43-46. Professor Henkin argues that
the ILC's consideration of the Cuidad Trujillo Conference's action demonstrates clearly that
no member of the commission intended to give such broadened extent to coastal state jurisdiction. See Henkin, supra note 142, at 65-66. For a somewhat more dispassionate treatment of the travauxpreparatoires of the ILC, see Gutteridge, The 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. 102, 106-10 (1959).
150. This negative type of conclusion is awkward to document without listing the continental shelf claims country by country and demonstrating that each claim either is not or,
because of geographical constraints, cannot be restricted to less than the entire continental
margin. A review of the continental shelf claims in PuB. No. 36, supra note 26, strongly
supports the validity of the conclusion.
151. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.21/SR. 16-22 (1974).
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Of these, only one, Switzerland, attacked coastal state jurisdiction
over the entire continental margin. The basis for the attack was
that such an idea was contrary to the provisions of the 1958 Geneva
Convention. 52 By contrast, almost all the other states were preoccupied, not with the issue of limiting coastal states' rights short of
200 miles, but with the issue of whether coastal state rights should
go beyond 200 miles where the continental margin extended that far
seaward. All but a handful of delegates11 3 conceded coastal state
rights over the continental margin. Even those who questioned the
open-ended definition of the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention
did so only to suggest that it was obsolete and had been subsumed
in the concept of the 200-mile EEZ. 15 4
Those delegates who did address continental shelf law, apart
from its relationship to the EEZ, concluded that widespread state
practice and the ICJ's pronouncements regarding the "natural prolongation of [the] land territory" confirmed sovereign rights in the
coastal state over the entire continental margin as a matter of international law. As a result, these views quite naturally are expressed
in Part VI, Articles 1 and 3, of the ICNT, which defines both the
continental shelf and the rights of the coastal state therein:
1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the
sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond
its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of
the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
3. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of
the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. 15 It
does not include the deep ocean floor or the subsoil thereof.'
Whether one considers Part VI of the ICNT as a synthesis of
the development of continental shelf law or separately examines
state practice under the Geneva Convention definition, one is compelled to conclude that the international community regards the entire continental margin as appertaining to the coastal state. Under
152. Id. at 157-58.
153. Id. (Switzerland), 160 (Soviet Union), 164 (Lesotho and the Federal Republic of
Germany).
154. For representative views, see id. at 145 (Libya), 146 (Zaire), 154 (Egypt).
155. ICNT/Rev. 1, supra note 9, arts. I & 3.
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this conclusion, coastal state rights in the continental margin exist
independently of any decisions taken at UNCLOS III. If these
rights are established as a matter of international law, the coastal
state is entitled to treat offshore hydrocarbons as "appertaining to
it."' 5 6 It may choose to exploit them or not; "that is its own affair,
but no one else may do so without its express consent."' '
Thus, even without the EEZ there would still be virtually no
basis under which the international community could claim the
right to share in the resources of the continental margin. In order
for the common heritage concept to apply to the resources of the
continental margin, coastal states would have to renounce sovereign rights which have inured to them under international law an action, as noted above, they are most unlikely to take.'5 8
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the Nepal Proposal appears unlikely to be accepted by the
international community, may not one nevertheless urge, as Professor Logue does, its adoption as the hope of a very tired law of the
sea conference?' 5 9 Like the basic idealism underlying the Nepal
Proposal, this argument is appealing. However, its appeal carries
with it the same lack of realism, and this may be harmful to the
hope of a successful conclusion to UNCLOS III. It is ironic that a
proposal based on hope and idealism should be harmful to both.
However, the complex nature of the interests and events at UNCLOS III almost guarantees this result.
From the establishment of the Seabed Committee in 1967 to
the present impasse at UNCLOS III, the law of the sea has provided an unhappy spectacle: nations maneuvering for narrow individual advantage; the developing world in bitter contention with
the developed world; extraneous international political developments intruding upon the Conference; the disillusionment of politicians, lawyers, and diplomats; confounded expectations; and,
perhaps most disturbing, an uneasy sense that the Conference may,
after all, fail. It may be that a conference of the magnitude and
difficulty of UNCLOS III is destined to bring in its train all these
problems. It cannot be doubted, however, that the hopes and
dreams for a new era of sharing and true internationalism in the
156.
157.
158.
159.

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 4, 22.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 121-35 supra.
Logue, supra note 1, at 625-26.
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oceans - which existed at the outset of UNCLOS III - have been
unrealized. In this environment, it seems almost cruel to suggest
that a single proposal will at once revive lost hopes and solve the
persistent problems of UNCLOS III. Such thinking is not only deceptive, it ignores the overriding note of nationalism that has been
the pervasive theme of the Conference.
Rather, a more sober approach to UNCLOS III is required.
Quick solutions and nostrums should be put aside and every effort
directed at solving the problems of the Conference through the
traditional, tedious, and painstaking process of negotiation. In that
process, regrettably, the Nepal Proposal can play no role.
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